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Caught Between the Scylla and Charybdis:' Ameliorating 
the Collision Course of Sexual Orientation Anti-
discrimination Rights and Religious Free Exercise Rights 
in the Public Workplace* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, religious individuals and institutions have increas-
ingly brought actions against the application of civil rights laws, particu-
larly those laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.2 
Correspondingly, and perhaps reciprocally, advocates for the prohibition 
of discrimination based on sexual orientation have increasingly become 
less tolerant of religious belief, particularly in the workplace.3 Recently, 
* Copyright© 2002 Josiah N. Drew. 
I. According to Greek mythology, epic mariners Jason and Odysseus successfully navigated 
the narrow strait between two equally imposing forces: Scylla, the six-headed and twelve-legged 
monster that would roll rocks upon passing ships and devour crew members; and Charybdis, the ter-
rible whirlpool monster that gulped down large portions of the surrounding sea, devouring ships and 
striking fear into these vessels' sailors. See generally THF LiBRARY OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY llY 
APOLLODORUS (BOOK I) 25 (Keith Aldrich trans., Coronado Press 1975). See also Hugo VanDer 
Molen, The Voyage of the Argonauts, at http://home-l.tiscali.nl/-molen/scripophily/texts/ 
USA,Argonaut.html (last modified Dec. 28, 200 I); Greek Mythology: Odysseus. at 
http://members.aol.com/GoddessCal/odym.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2001). 
2. See. e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the gov-
ernment had a sufficiently compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination where the Internal 
Revenue Service denied tax-exempt status to this non-profit, private, religious institution that pre-
scribed racially discriminatory admissions standards); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 
1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (reviewing a case in which a religious publishing house, claiming belief 
in a religious doctrine that prohibited church members from bringing lawsuits against the church, 
dismissed employees in retaliation for filing discrimination claims); Voluntary Ass'n of Religious 
Leaders, Churches, & Orgs. v. Waihee, 800 F. Supp. 882, 883 (D. Haw. 1992) (dismissing challenge 
to state statute prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 
N.E.2d 1160, 1161, 1166 (Mass. 1985) (determining that a state law prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination in employment unnecessarily burdened a church-published newspaper's free exercise 
right); State ex rei. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 846, 847 n.4 (Minn. 
1985) (stating that health club owners who insisted on only hiring employees whose religious beliefs 
were consistent with their religious beliefs were required to comply with the state law prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, and marital status). 
3. See generally Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Serv., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 200 I) (holding 
that the state medical facility is not required to reasonably accommodate a state employee's religious 
aversion to counseling homosexual clients because to hold otherwise would pose an undue burden 
upon the state employer); Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corrs., 251 F.3d 1199 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the Minnesota Department of Corrections violated its employees' First Amendment right to free 
speech rather than free exercise when those employees suffered adverse employment action for 
bringing their Bibles to a gay sensitivity training seminar); Philips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843 (8th 
287 
288 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVI 
public employers have found it increasingly difficult to navigate through 
these clashing phenomena, and now with the advent of state-endorsed 
gay4 rights sensitivity training, public employers are caught in a culture 
war with both sides-religious advocates and gay advocates-engulfing 
employers with their respective claims of superior rights. 
Because, historically, freedom of religion was the first right en-
trenched within our jurisprudential framework, and because gay anti-
discrimination rights are among the newest or latest rights, this Comment 
primarily focuses on how gay rights (or the "weaker" of these two clash-
ing rights) may, without mandating acceptance by those who are morally 
opposed to the gay lifestyle, gain greater social and legal recognition. Al-
though on their face sexual orientation rights and religious rights appear 
remarkably opposed to one another, they are in reality quite similar in a 
significant number of ways; and therefore, they should be similarly 
treated. 
This Comment recognizes that comparing religion and sexual orien-
tation may, at first glance, shock the reader and that readers with either a 
zealous, gay advocacy agenda, or, conversely, readers with a fundamen-
tal religious bent will reject this comparison outright. However, the ma-
jority that exists between these two polar views may benefit from a pol-
icy framework that recognizes that the state must remain as neutral as 
possible in such a culture clash. Polls reveal that a solid majority of 
Americans would support gay anti-discrimination legislation.5 Americans 
also fear, however, that the state is prepared to endorse or already has 
endorsed a permissive sexual orientation value system.6 Vermont's Sena-
tor James M. Jeffords aptly aligned these two, somewhat conflicting sen-
timents when he declared that "[p]eople don't want to go too far on 
changing marriage and traditional relationships .... But the feeling is 
when someone wants to work someplace, they ought to be able to get a 
job."7 
Cir. 200 I) (holding that a Missouri Department of Social Services supervisor violated her em-
ployee's § 1983 civil rights where, upon learning of that employee's religious views on homosexual-
ity, that supervisor took adverse employment action); Hyman v. Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528 
(W.O. Ky. 2001) (holding that the city of Louisville's sexual orientation anti-discrimination statute 
does not violate, on free exercise grounds, a private employer's desire to refuse employment to ho-
mosexuals). 
4. For the purposes of this Comment, "gay" is an inclusive term referring to not only male 
homosexuals, but also to lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons. 
5. See Human Rights Campaign: Working for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Tram-gender 
Equal Rights, at http://www.hrc.org/issues/federal_leg/enda/background/index.asp (last visited Dec. 
3,2001). 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. Eric Schmitt, Senators Reject Both Job-Bias Ban and Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
II, 1996, at A I. 
287] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 289 
Part II of this Comment provides a basic understanding of free exer-
cise jurisprudence and also describes the current state of sexual orienta-
tion discrimination law. Part II also goes beyond the law and attempts to 
provide a snapshot of contemporary American society's take on religious 
and gay rights. Part III chronicles the advent of gay sensitivity training 
into the workplace. This section, by explicating the Eighth Circuit's 
Altman v. Minnesota Department of Corrections8 case, also highlights 
how this educational movement provokes a culture clash of values, par-
ticularly in the public workplace. As mentioned above, because rights 
based upon sexual orientation is the relatively new player in respect to 
constitutionally enshrined religious rights, Part IV focuses on the mis-
guided constitutional tact upon which many gay rights advocates have 
exerted much energy. Specifically, Part IV asserts that attempting to ele-
vate sexual orientation discrimination directly into the U.S. Constitution 
through the path of equal protection is, legally and socially, the wrong 
approach. Part V introduces a proposal. Because gay rights advocates de-
sire more than just legal equality in society, Part V prescribes a path by 
which gay rights advocates may achieve such equality without infringing 
upon others' rights. Specifically, Part V advocates (1) that, in light of 
major American social movements, particularly the American civil rights 
movement, gay rights advocates should look to religion rather than spurn 
religion in their quest for equality; (2) that legislative means rather than 
judicial means should be used to gain the ultimate end of equality; and 
(3) that, because religion and sexual orientation are substantially similar 
in significant ways, legislative enactments should be "principly" based 
upon the First Amendment's religion clauses. Such a principled legisla-
tive framework is better than simply passing anti-discrimination legisla-
tion based on sexual orientation because it not only provides that sexual 
orientation, like religion, should be relegated to the private sphere where 
most Americans feel it properly belongs but also because it assures other 
factions (particularly religious factions within our heavily pluralistic so-
ciety) that the state will not endorse or promote either the rejection or ac-
ceptance of gay rights. In short, the state will remain neutral; or, in other 
words, the state will not affirmatively promote or endorse gay sensitivity 
programs in a public setting any more than it cannot promote religious 
sensitivity. Part VI offers a brief conclusion. 
8. 251 F .3d 1199 (8'th Cir. 2001 ). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that the state "shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof .... "9 Because the Constitution restrains govern-
ment action, these First Amendment protections are "most pertinent to 
religious disputes that occur within public-sector workplaces." 10 The free 
exercise clause, on its face, bars the government from infringing upon a 
person's right to hold private religious beliefs. 11 
The free exercise clause also bars the government from infringing 
upon a person's right to engage in religiously motivated conduct12 unless 
the government can show a compelling interest why it should do so. 13 
Therefore, the government, in its role as employer, may infringe upon 
constitutionally protected religious conduct in two notable circum-
stances. First, a government employer may prohibit or limit religious 
conduct that hinders the performance of that public employer's mission. 
Second, due to the establishment clause, government agencies should not 
permit their employees to engage in religious conduct when that conduct 
may reasonably convey the impression to the public that the government 
is supporting or endorsing religion or religious practices. 14 
9. U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphasis added). The first clause is referred to as the establish-
ment clause; the second clause is referred to as the free exercise clause. Under the incorporation 
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, both of these clauses are applicable to the several states. 
See Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 ( 1940). 
10. MICHAEL WOLF ET AL., RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 5 ( 1998) (footnote omitted). Although private sector employ-
ers generally have more leeway than public sector employers to squelch their employees' First 
Amendment religious rights, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does provide employees some 
religious protection in the private sector. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1994 ). 
II. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ofthe Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488 (1990). 
12. See id. 
13. See 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 106-107 (3d ed. 1999). From its 1963 decision of Sherbert v. Verner, 
the Supreme Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny even when analyzing the government's 
incidental imposition of burdens upon religious conduct. In 1990, however, the Supreme Court re-
turned to its pre-Sherbert position in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. 
Smith, by holding that unless the free exercise clause is invoked in conjunction with other constitu-
tional protections (hybrid rights), the government need not assert a compelling interest as justifica-
tion of its actions if religion is only incidentally affected by a neutral, generally applicable law. Only 
when the objective of a law is to regulate religion and if that regulation places a substantial burden 
upon religious conduct should the compelling interest test apply. See WOLFE, supra note 10, at 145-
47. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 ( 1993); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990); Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
14. See WOLFE, supra note 10, at 6. Government agencies need not permit such conduct be-
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B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Jurisprudence 
1. Federallaw 
Although federal law provides basic legal protection against public 
and private employment discrimination on the basis of race, gender, re-
ligion, national origin, or disability, there is neither a constitutional pro-
vision nor a federal statute "that explicitly bars discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation." 15 
With the Employment Non-Discrimination Act ("ENDA"), Con-
gress, throughout the 1990s, has introduced and debated passage of a 
statutory scheme to protect against sexual orientation discrimination in 
the workplace. 16 This legislation, however, has consistently failed to 
pass. 17 Currently, EDNA's reintroduction is scheduled before the 1 07th 
Congress on July 31, 2002. 18 It should be noted, however, that pursuant 
to a recent executive order, employers within the federal public sector 
may not discriminate upon the basis of sexual orientation. 19 
2. State and local law 
Most civil rights legislation designed to protect against sexual orien-
tation discrimination has taken root at the state and local levels of gov-
emment.20 Currently, twelve states and the District of Columbia prohibit 
such workplace discrimination.21 Covering discrimination not only in 
cause the government would then breach the principle of religious neutrality at the heart of the estab-
1 ishment clause. See id. 
15. Thomas H. Barnard & Timothy J. Downing, Emerging Law on Sexual Orientation and 
Fmplovmenr, 29lJ. MEM. L. R1 v. 555,557 ( 1999). 
16. See id at 557. 
17. "FNDA was introduced in the 103d Congress in 1994 in House Bill4636. H.R. 4636, 
I 03d Con g. ( 1994 ). The Bill was reintroduced in the I 04th Congress in 1995 in House Bill 1863. 
H.R. 1863, I 04th Con g. ( 1995 ). It also was reintroduced in the tirst session of the 105th Congress in 
1997 in both the House and the Senate. See H.R. 1858, I 05th Cong. ( 1997); S. 869, I 05th Cong. 
( 1997)." Barnard & Downing, supra note 15, at 565 n.50. With bipartisan support, the Bill was in-
troduced and failed bcf(Jrc the I 06th Congress. See H.R. 2355, I 06th Cong. ( 1999); S. I 06, I 06th 
Cong. ( 1999). ld at 565 n.51. 
I K See H.R. 2692, I 07th Cong. (2002); S. 1284, I 07th Cong. (2002). See also Human Rights 
Campaign.· Working filr Lesbian. Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Equal Rights, at 
http://www.hrc.org/issucs/ti.:deral_leg/enda!index.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 200 I). 
19. See Barnard & Downing, supra note 15, at 557. 
20. States, of course, have power to enact such legislation under their reserved, Tenth 
Amendment police powers. See. e.g, David B. Cruz, Note, Piety and Prejudice: Free Exercise Ex-
c:mplion From Laws Prohihiring Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1183 
( 1994 ). The Tenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respec-
tively, or to the people." See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
21. These include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Cal. Lab. Code§ 
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employment, but also in housing and public accommodations, most of 
these laws are broader in scope than ENDA would be. Additionally, 
eight states have executive orders that bar discrimination in public em-
ployment based upon sexual orientation.22 Finally, in addition to state 
law, over 165 municipalities and counties have enacted anti-
discrimination legislation based upon sexual orientation.23 
C. Snapshots of the Current Landscape 
Because religious rights and gay rights separately, let alone collec-
tively, engender such controversy in our society, a brief examination of 
1102.1 (1997); Conn. Gen. Stat.§§ 46a-8lc (1997); D.C. Code Ann.§ 1-2512 (1997); Haw. Rev. 
Stat.§§ 368-1, 378-2 (1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 98 (Law. Co-op. 1996); Minn. Stat.§§ 
363.03,363.12 (1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 354-A:7, :8 (1998); N.J. Rev. Stat.§§ 10:2-1, :5-4, 
:5-12 (1996); R.I. Gen. Laws§§ 28-5-2,28-5-7 (1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 495 (1996); Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.36 ( 1996). "The State of Maine had a law on the books prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation; however, the law was overturned by the voters of Maine in a statewide referen-
dum. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 4552,4553 (West 1997) (repealed 1998)." Barnard & Down-
ing, supra note 15, at 557 n.S. See also Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal a Law on Gay Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at A 1 (reporting voter repeal of Maine law that banned discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation in housing, employment, credit, and places of public accommodation). 
22. These states include: Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 90-13-98 (Colo. 1990); Exec. Order No. 
Ewe 92-7 (La. 1992) (expired 1996); Exec. Order No. 01.01.1993.16 (Md. 1993); Exec. Order No. 
85-15 (N.M. 1985); Exec. Order No. 28.1 (N.Y. 1993); Exec. Order No. 83-64 (Ohio 1983); Exec. 
Order No. 1988-1 (Pa. 1988); Exec. Order No. 85-09 (Wash. 1985). See Barnard & Downing, supra 
note 15, at 558 n.6. 
23. Among the cities having such ordinances are some of the larger cities in the United 
States, including: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Detroit, Dal-
las, San Diego, San Francisco, Atlanta, Boston, Phoenix, Denver, Baltimore, Minneapo-
lis, St. Paul, St. Louis, Kansas City, Portland, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, San Jose, Cleve-
land, and Columbus (Ohio). See Phoenix, Ariz., Ordinance G-3558 (July 8, 1992); L.A., 
Cal., Mun. Code ch. IV, art. 12 (1979); San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 0-17453 (Apr. 16, 
1990); S.F., Cal., Admin. Code art. 33, § 3301 et seq. (1987); San Jose, Cal., Affirmative 
Action Guidelines, Resolution 58076 (Feb. 5, 1985); Denver, Colo., City Code § 28-91 et 
seq. (1990); Atlanta, Ga., City Charter, 1973 Ga. Laws, pt. 2188 (1986); Chicago, Ill., 
Mun. Code ch. 199 et seq. (1988); Baltimore, Md., City Code art. 4, §§ 9(16), 12(8) 
(1988); Boston, Mass., Code tit. 12, ch. 40 (1984); Minneapolis, Minn., Code tit. 7, chs. 
139, 141 (1975); St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code ch. 183 (1990); St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 
62710 (Oct. 6, 1992); N.Y., N.Y., Admin. Code tit. 8 (1993); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 
77-94 (Mar. 23, 1994 ); Columbus, Ohio, City Code ch. 2325 ( 1984 ); Portland, Or., Reso-
lution 31510 (1974); Phila., Pa., Fair Practices Ordinance ch. 9-1100 (1982); Pittsburgh, 
Pa., Code tit. 6, ch. 651, art. V (I 990); Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 22318 (Jan. 1995) 
(amending Dallas City Code ch. 34, art. V, §§ 34-35); Milwaukee, Wis., Discrimination 
Ordinance ch. 109-15 (Dec. 22, 1987). Such laws, however, are notjust on the books of 
large cities. Indeed, in Ohio alone, the small towns of Athens, Cleveland Heights, Lake-
wood, North Olmsted, Oberlin, Westlake, and Yellow Springs have such laws on the 
books. See Cleveland Heights, Ohio, Ordinance 77-94 (Mar. 23, 1994); Yellow Springs, 
Ohio, Town Charter§ 29 (Nov. 1979); North Olmstead, Ohio, Ordinance 96-154. More-
over, small cities, such as Youngstown, Ohio; Toledo, Ohio; and Harrisburg, Pennsyl-
vania also have such laws on the books. 
Barnard & Downing, supra note I 5, at 558 n.7. 
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the legal framework that supports these respective rights is insufficient to 
understand current American temperament. Therefore, the following sec-
tion provides a cursory glimpse of the current "culture-scape" in regard 
to these two issues. 
1. State of the secular and religious climate 
Because American society aspires to be a democratic and pluralistic 
society, it may be fairly characterized as a healthily schizophrenic soci-
ety. Americans cling to their secular pursuits, which have undisputedly 
spurred tremendous legal, scientific, and technological innovations.24 
Secularism, like religious factions, enjoys a non-cohesive variety of ad-
herents: atheists, humanists, materialists, etc., to name just a few. Given 
this affinity for secular pursuits, it is not surprising that virtually all soci-
ologists have noted that secularism's influence, for decades or perhaps 
centuries, has been on the rise in Western culture.Z5 
Yet, despite secularism's increasing role in modem society, religious 
discussion in the American public sphere has, if anything, become less 
taboo and more avant-garde recently.26 The two candidates in the 2000 
presidential election provide an example of this trend on a national scale. 
Republican candidate George W. Bush proudly shared his Born Again 
Christian insights with the electorate, and stated that Jesus was his favor-
ite philosopher.27 Bush's opponent, Democratic candidate Al Gore, dis-
closed that he often approaches problems with the religious frame of ref-
erence: "What would Jesus do?"28 
Additionally, the wake of September 11 may send more than "shock" 
waves of people to the nation's churches, mosques, and synagogues. 
Some sociologists, in fact, favorably compare the current state of affairs 
to times of past Great Awakenings.29 Pollsters also claim that spiritual 
momentum, "spurred by Americans searching for deeper meaning amid 
material excess[,]" continues to snowball. 30 In any event, one thing is 
24. See, e.g, Wang Gungwu, Limits of Secularism, THE STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at 
35. 
25. See id. 
26. See, e.g, Kent Greenawalt, Religion and American Political Judgments, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. RFV. 401,402 (2001 ). 
27. See Hanna Rosin, Bush's 'Christ Moment' Is Put to Political Test by Christians; Act of 
Faith or Partisan Ploy, It Draws Faithful·.,. Attention, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1999, at Al4. 
28. See Richard Perez-Petildna, Lieberman Seeks Greater Role ji>r Religion in Public Life, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,2000, at Al4. 
29. See Jenn Burleson, Will Terrorist Attacks Bring True Revival, ROANOKE TIMES AND 
WORLD NEWS, Oct. 8, 200 l, at C l. 
30. Rebecca Goldsmith, How Long Will the Candles Burn?, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 
Sept. 24, 2001. Approximately 95% of all Americans profess a belief in God (citing consistent 
Gallup poll findings even prior to the September ll attacks). See, e.g., George Gallup, Jr., Religion 
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clear: American society may not be easily reduced to the polar opposites 
of secularism and religion. Rather, Americans tend to fall upon a contin-
uum between these two ideologies, and this, in tum, tends to create a 
healthily schizophrenic society. 
2. Glimpse of the gay equality climate 
A glimpse of the diverse culture-scape is naturally helpful to provide 
some context to America's sexual orientation anti-discrimination laws. 
But specific inquiry into the legal landscape is required. Currently, gay 
equality jurisprudence in American law is incoherent. Although an in-
creasing number of states and municipalities31 prohibit the use of a per-
son's sexual orientation as a basis of discrimination,32 many states, 
firmly based in the Supreme Court's Bowers v. Hardwick33 holding that 
upheld the constitutionality of sodomy statutes, still maintain the tradi-
tional proscriptions of homosexual conduct. This line of gay jurispru-
dence provides a sharp contrast with popular culture where critically ac-
claimed television programs, such as The Ellen Show and Will and 
Grace, feature openly gay protagonists.34 
Moreover, for courts to add another layer of legal analysis, particu-
larly First Amendment religious rights analysis, to this mixed cultural 
landscape and increasingly complex scheme of gay rights jurisprudence 
creates an exceptionally complex quagmire through which public em-
ployers must navigate. Ultimately, the divisive force of these two stances 
can gnaw not only at society in general but also splinter specific institu-
tions. For example, even the ACLU has experienced how divisive these 
forces can be. In the gay rights versus religious rights landmark case of 
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. George-
town University, 35 the national ACLU affiliate, from an anti-
discrimination perspective, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the gay 
students group. The local D.C. chapter of the ACLU, on the other hand, 
filed an amicus emphasizing the Catholic university's First Amendment 
freedom to express religious values.36 Cases such as Georgetown set up a 
in America: Will the Vitality of Churches Be the Surprise of the Next Century?, TilE PUBLIC 
PERSPECTIVE, Oct.-Nov. 1995, at 1-8. 
31. See infra Part II.C.l. 
32. See Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Ra-
cial Equality, 40 How. L.J. 513,529 (1997). 
33. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
34. See The Rosie O'Donnell Show (syndicated television broadcast, Dec. 6, 2001) (featuring 
Phil Donahue, a noted day-time television pioneer, discussing how far gays have come in gaining 
social acceptance). 
35. 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987) (en bane). 
36. See Walsh, supra note 32, at 516. 
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classic constitutional collision: under the First Amendment's free exer-
cise clause, the religious group claims the liberty to exclude and express 
its disapproval of another group; while under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's equal protection clause, the excluded, gay rights group clamors 
for equal treatment. 37 Cases that pit these two rights against one another 
certainly guarantee that "discrimination in the workplace on the basis of 
sexual orientation could become one of the hottest topics in the field of 
employment law in the next five to ten years."38 
3. The advent of gay sensitivity training in the workplace 
As early as 1992, the U.S. Census Bureau revealed that at least 1.5 
million households in America had self-identified their homes as homo-
sexual domestic partnerships. 39 Because the law could offer only limited 
equality to America's increasingly diverse workforce, many gay rights 
advocates sounded a clarion call to educate rather than legislate. 40 Enter 
gay sensitivity training. By the mid-l990s, advocates, proclaiming that 
the business community could affirmatively combat homophobia and 
heterosexism, 41 and that the gay community need no longer tolerate the 
aggregate losses incurred by sexual orientation discrimination, began 
educating employers and employees about sexual orientation issues.42 
Specifically, advocates reasonably convinced employers that gays are 
likely to be less productive employees where they ( 1) expend too much 
unproductive energy to "stay in the closet"; (2) experience a lack of job 
satisfaction in an environment of fear and mistrust; and (3) expenence 
undue stress in an implicitly heterosexist environment.43 
37. See William N. Eskcridge, Jr., Symposium: Group Conflict and the Constitution· Race, 
Sexuality, and Religion A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Colli-
sions o(Liherty and Equality in American Puhlic Law, I 06 YALE L.J. 2411, 2415 ( 1997). 
38. Barnard & Downing, supra note 15, 576. 
39. See Susan Spielman and Liz Winfield, Making Sexual Orientation Part of Diversity, 49 
TRAINING AND DEVJ·:LOPMI·NT 50 ( 1995). 
40. See BRIAN MCNAUGHT, GAY ISSUES IN TilE WORKPLACE xiii (1993) (discussing where 
prominently representative companies such as AT&T, Bell Communications Research, Lotus, Levi-
Straus, and MCA took such measures against heterosexism and homophobia in the workplace). 
41. Definitions of heterosexism vary. Some advocates describe it as the assumption that eve-
ryone is or ought to be heterosexual. See MCNAUGIIT, supra note 40, at 54; see also Spielman & 
Winfield, supra note 39. Others align it more closely with invidious racism when they define it as 
"policies and practices which elevate heterosexuality and subordinate homosexuality." See Richard 
Hunt, Have Homosexual Rights in the Workplace Gone Too Far?, at www.antipas.org/news/world/ 
homos.html (Nov. 7, 2001 ). 
42. See generally MCNAIIGIIT, supra note 40. 
43. See McNAUCiiiT, supra note 40, at 1-11; see also Spielman & Winfield, supra note 39. 
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4. The content of gay sensitivity training 
Most gay-rights advocates can agree on the following core content: 
(1) a gay presenter is preferable to a heterosexual presenter because he or 
she can convey that homosexuals are normal and competent; (2) human 
resources and management must support the training; (3) statistics and 
studies should be used to persuade trainees; and (4) attendance should 
probably be mandatory to ensure that attending gays will not be harassed 
or stigmatized and to ensure that those who have objecting personal be-
liefs will have to at least listen.44 Some seminars particularly address the 
double standards that heterosexuals place upon gays in the workplace.45 
The Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace seminar, for example, informs 
employees that heterosexual privileges should apply equally to gays, in-
cluding: ( 1) the right to marry; (2) the right to kiss affectionately on the 
street; (3) the right to children without any questions; ( 4) the right to cus-
tody of children if a partner dies; (5) the right to be sexual with your 
partner without breaking the law. 46 
Of course, the gay sensitivity approach is not without its detractors. 
Newspaper columns and editorials reveal that some workers are not 
happy with this educational approach. For instance, one person lauded 
the actions of fifty Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Labo-
ratory workers who recently walked out on a homosexual diversity 
speaker.47 Recently, a journalist labeled this educational approach as 
"sinister" when it is sanctioned by the state (for example, where Maoist 
China employed coercion, deprivation, and torture to convert its citizens 
to Communism in its cultural revolution camps).48 According to this 
writer, American sensitivity trainers, fortunately, have not yet had these 
sinister means available to them.49 
44. See Spielman & Winfield, supra note 39. 
45. See Cyberfeds, Employees Challenge Sexual Orientation Training, at www.feds.com/ 
nll_lib/fealfea0208.htm#article 16 (last visited Mar. 5, 2002). 
46. See ACLJ Files Suit Against Minnesota Department Corrections, at www.aclj.org/news 
/NR _98040 !.asp (Apr. I, 1998). The ACLJ adds another factor: the right to be offended when het-
erosexuals discuss weddings or engagements from their perspective. See id. 
4 7. See Mary Ann Stager, Editorial, Insensitivity Just Another Label, IDAHO FALLS POST 
REG., June 8, 2000, at A8. 
48. See Charles Krauthammer, Editorial, The 'How-To' Society, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1993, 
at A25. Krauthammer recalled how about "(f]ive years ago, a religious student at the University of 
Michigan expressed the view that homosexuality is immoral. He was made to recant and ordered a 
dose of sensitivity training. This will make him broad-minded." !d. 
49. See id 
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III. A REVEALING TIP OF THE ICEBERG: ALTMAN, THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S 
GAY SENSITIVITY TRAINING CASE HIGHLIGHTS TENSIONS IN THE 
PUBLIC WORKPLACE 
By the late 1990s, the gay sensitivity training movement no longer 
remained in the private employment workplace. This educational move-
ment also grew within the public employment sphere. Such a develop-
ment, on its face, appears consistent with the growth of state sexual ori-
entation anti-discrimination laws. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
Minnesota, a state which passed such anti-discrimination legislation,50 
provides the setting for an exemplary case which exposes the contempo-
rary public workplace's struggle to effectively placate the tension be-
tween religious free exercise and freedom from sexual orientation dis-
crimination. 
A. Events Leading up to the Lawsuit 
In light ofMinnesota's designation of a "Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and 
Transgender Pride Month,"51 a training coordinator with the Minnesota 
Department of Corrections facility in Shakopee ("MCFS") persuaded the 
facility warden, in mid-1997, to include a program dealing with issues of 
gays and lesbians in the workplace at MCFS's next regularly scheduled 
training session.52 Thomas Altman, an employee of MCSF, "sent [the 
warden] an e-mail objecting to the mandatory nature of this program and 
protest[ ed] that it would 'raise deviant sexual behavior for staff to a level 
of acceptance and respectability. "'53 
The warden, faced with Altman's objection and rumors that other 
staff members objected, issued a memo explaining that this "program 
was part of 'the facility's strong commitment to create a work environ-
ment where people are treated respectfully, regardless of their individual 
differences. "'54 The warden also countered the implication that the train-
ing was designed to tell the staff what their personal beliefs and attitudes 
should be. 55 Therefore, attendance was mandatory. 56 
Prior to the sensitivity training, Altman and other objecting staff 
members reviewed the training material and concluded, according to the 
50. See MINN. STAT.§§ 363.03,363.12 (1996). 
51. See ACU Files Suit Against Minnesota Department of Corrections, at 
www.aclj.org/news /NR _98040l.asp (Apr. I, 1998). 
52. See Altman v. Minn. Dep't ofCorrs., 251 F.3d 1199, 1201 (8th Cir. 2001). 
53. /d. at 120 I. 
54. Jd 
55. See supra Part II.A (discussing how the First Amendment's free exercise clause abso-
lutely prohibits the government's attempt to control belief). 
56. See Altman, 251 F.3d at 1201. 
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wording of their filed complaint, that the training would be "state-
sponsored indoctrination designed to sanction, condone, promote, and 
otherwise approve behavior and a style of life [they believe to be] im-
moral, sinful, perverse, and contrary to the teachings of the Bible."57 
Immediately prior to the training, Altman and two other co-workers 
met at Altman's home and decided to take their Bibles with them to the 
mandatory training as a silent protest and as a support for the discomfort 
the materials caused them because of their religious beliefs. 58 During the 
training, Altman and his co-workers "read their Bibles, copied scripture, 
and participated to a limited extent. They did not disrupt the trainers' 
presentation."59 Many of Altman's supervisors attended the meeting, and 
none of them complained about his behavior or the behavior of his co-
workers, "or told them to stop reading their Bibles."60 
At the end of the training session, two trainers complained to 
MCFS's affirmative action officer about Altman's and the others' behav-
ior.61 Based on their conduct at the training session, MCFS issued 
Altman and his fellow co-workers formal reprimands. 62 These repri-
mands made Altman and the others ineligible for promotion for two 
years.63 This was Altman's first negative job performance review. 64 
B. The Tension Spurs a Lawsuit to the Eighth Circuit 
This Comment only provides a cursory description of how the Eighth 
Circuit handled this case because, from this Comment's perspective, it is 
the underlying facts and circumstances that gave rise to the Altman case 
that are of greater significance than the actual analysis and outcome of 
this one case itself. 65 
57. Silent Protest of Training Session Was Protected Nonverbal Speech, NAT'L PliH. EMP. 
REP., July 5, 2001. 
58. See Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corrs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 14897, at *6 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 9, 1999). 
59. Altman, 251 F.3d at 120 I. 
60. !d. 
61. See Altman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14897, at *7. Specifically, the reprimands were is-
sued for violating DOC Policies 2-203.78 and 2-203.7C, which respectively provide that 
"[e]mployees shall conduct themselves both on and otT the job in a manner that will not bring dis-
credit or criticism to the Department"; and "[ e ]mployees shall not exhibit behavior that demonstrates 
prejudice or which has the effect of holding any person, group or organization up to ridicule or con-
tempt." !d. at *7-*8. 
62. See Altman, 251 F.3dat 1201-02. 
63. See id. at 1202. 
64. See Altman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 14897, at *8. 
65. Because more cases like Altman are likely to arise (and not just in the public sector), 
practitioners and other interested parties are encouraged to analyze the Eighth Circuit's handling of 
this case. See, e.g., Simon J. Nadel, Employment Discrimination--Religion: Religion and Sexual 
Orientation at Work May Produce Combustible Combination, 68 U.S.L. WEI,K 2163 ( 1999); Jack S. 
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After the MCFS took its adverse employment action against Thomas 
Altman and his co-workers, Altman and the others, represented by the 
American Center for Legal Justice ("ACLJ"),66 filed an action against the 
Minnesota Department of Corrections and against their supervisors in 
their official capacities on several grounds, many of which are beyond 
the scope of this Comment.67 With regard to the pertinent issue of free 
exercise, the district court, relying upon reasoning of Employment Divi-
sion Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith68 and the 
Pickerinl9 balancing test, granted summary judgment in favor of 
Altman and the others. Factually, the court was troubled by the notion 
that, prior to and after the gay sensitivity training session, inattentiveness 
at MCFS training sessions had never been disciplined. 70 Other employ-
ees, for example, at this or other training sessions had read magazines, 
fallen asleep, worked on unrelated paperwork, crocheted, and even left 
early. 71 MCFS never disciplined these inattentive employees; however, 
MCFS did discipline Altman and the others for inattentively but silently 
reading their Bibles.72 While the district court recognized that MCFS 
"has a strong interest in preventing harassment based upon sexual orien-
tation,"73 the court emphatically noted that MCFS failed to show how 
Altman's and the others' Bible reading directly or even indirectly con-
tributed to or fostered any such harassment; therefore, the court con-
cluded that "judgment in favor of [Altman] is warranted on the issue of 
Free Exercise."74 
Yaitayanonta, Note, In State Legislatures We Trust?: The Compelling Interest Presumption andRe-
ligious Free txercise Challenges to State Civil Rights Laws, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 886,887 (2001 ). 
66. Christian broadcaster, Pat Robertson, founded the ACLJ. See Debra Baker, Acting on 
One "s Belief.v: Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom Spills Over Into Workplace, 86 
A.B.A. J. 18 (Jan. 2000). Arguably, the ACLJ is to the "Religious Right" what the ACLU is to the 
"Liberal Lett." 
67. At the district court level, Altman and his co-workers submitted their complaint claiming 
that (i) Defendants had violated their right to free speech as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (ii) Defendants had violated various rights as 
guaranteed by the Minnesota constitution; and (iii) Defendants' reprimand and failure to promote 
constituted an unfair employment practice in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, among other claims. See Altman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14897, at *1-*2. 
68. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
69. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
70. See Altman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 14897, at *17-*20. 
71. See id. at *17-*18. 
72. See id 
73. /d.at*l9. 
74. !d. at * 19-*20. Because the Eighth Circuit could identify no significant burden placed on 
Altman's and the others' Bible reading activity, the circuit court reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on the free exercise issue. See Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corrs., 251 F .3d 1199, 
1203-05 (8th Cir. 2001 ). Specifically, the court stated that "the only burden placed on Appellants 
was a requirement they attend a seventy-five-minute training program at which they were exposed to 
widely-accepted views that they oppose on faith-based principles. This is not, in our view, a substan-
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IV. WHY EQUAL PROTECTION HOLDS LITTLE HOPE OF RESOLVING THIS 
DEBATE 
As mentioned above,75 because the First Amendment's free exercise 
clause has enjoyed over 200 years of legal interpretation and analysis and 
because all state constitutions provide for the free exercise of religion or 
freedom of conscience, 76 this Comment will focus on the newer or lesser 
right's-freedom from sexual orientation-based discrimination-plight 
in American society at large as well as the public employment sector in 
particular. Unfortunately, in an attempt to elevate their claims to consti-
tutional par, gay rights advocates misplace their reliance upon the equal 
protection clause. To achieve their ultimate goals, such advocates should 
tum toward, rather than away from, the American religious experience-
culturally and legally. 
Many, if not most, people recognize that gays face serious obstacles 
when they seek workplace, housing, marital, adoption, armed forces, and 
privacy rights because many current laws and policies classify and nega-
tively impact people according to their gay sexual orientation. Gay rights 
advocates, arguing that such classifications trigger equal protection con-
cerns, have sought increased judicial scrutiny for decades. However, fo-
cusing so much energy in the equal protection arena is unlikely to grant 
these advocates the recognition and rights they seek. Equal protection ju-
risprudence is inconsistent, disorganized, and appears closed-especially 
because courts, since the 1970s, have gotten out of the business of creat-
ing new suspect classes. 
A. A Brief Review of Equal Protection 's Three- Tiered Framework 
The Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause commands 
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."77 The Fifth Amendment's due process clause 
similarly applies to the federal government, which also may not classify 
tial burden on their free exercise of religion." !d. at 1204. Although not pertinent to this Comment, it 
is worthy to note, however, that the Eight Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Altman's 
First Amendment free speech claims. See id. at 1202-03. Therefore, reversal on the free exercise 
issue did not prove fatal to Altman and his fellow Bible readers' claims. Of course, as stated at the 
outset of Part Ill, this Comment's purpose in exploring the Altman case is not to prove its outcome 
or underlying analysis, but rather to expose the growing tension between advancing sexual orienta-
tion rights and religious rights in the public workplace. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
75. See supra Parts l & ll.A. 
76. See Vaitayanonta, supra note 65, at 902 n.54. 
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
287] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 301 
"individuals in a way which would violate the equal protection clause."78 
In other words, courts, depending on what group is affected, apply dif-
ferent standards when examining group-classifying laws. 
1. The rational relationship or rational basis test 
This test provides the default or general rule in equal protection 
analysis where legislation is presumed valid and "will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest."79 This lowest tier "is designed to allow even unwise legis-
lation to pass muster easily, because the democratic process, rather than 
the courts, is supposed to be the usual means for repealing even foolish 
legislation."80 Therefore, "[m]ost laws-including laws that classify peo-
ple according to sexual orientation, age, or wealth-will be upheld."81 
2. The heightened or intermediate scrutiny test 
Under this standard, courts "will not uphold a [legislative] classifica-
tion unless they find that the classification has a 'substantial relationship' 
to an 'important' government interest."82 Legislative classifications, 
based on gender, merit this quasi-suspect classification because such 
classifications "very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capa-
bilities of men and women."83 Legislative classifications based on ille-
gitimacy also merit this mid-tiered scrutiny because "illegitimacy is be-
yond the individual's control and 'bears no relation to the individual's 
ability to participate in and contribute to society. "'84 
3. The strict scrutiny test 
Courts apply this test when the government classifies by race, na-
tional origin, or alienage.85 Such laws will be sustained "only if they are 
[narrowly] tailored to serve a compelling state interest."86 Courts use this 
stricter test when examining such classifications because these minorities 
lack the political power necessary to protect their rights in the democratic 
78. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 206 (3d ed. 1999). 
79. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
80. EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE 
F AlLURE OF CLASS BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 20 ( 1999). 
81. /d. at 22. 
82. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, at 219. 
83. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. 
84. /d. (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)). 
85. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, at 218. 
86. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
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process.87 Strict scrutiny is also applied when examining race, national 
origin and alienage-based classifications because these classifications 
"are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state inter-
est that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect 
prejudice and antipathy."88 
B. Applying the Three-Tiered Framework to Gays 
Although gays assert several reasonable arguments why they meet 
the Carotene Products89 criteria, to argue further upon this constitutional 
thread is likely futile for several reasons and should therefore be aban-
doned for other theories.9° Clearly, many gay rights advocates desire 
more than rational-basis scrutiny, which has been described as "minimal 
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact,"91 because "[i]f the Supreme 
Court were to decide that gays ... are a suspect class and direct all courts 
to apply strict scrutiny to laws that classify according to sexual orienta-
tion, virtually all these laws would likely be struck down."92 However, 
courts, including and especially the Supreme Court, have been reluctant 
to find that gays are a suspect class and probably never will. Because 
gays have difficulty qualifying for heightened status under the factors 
outlined in Carotene Products, gays will probably not achieve their equal 
treatment goals through an equal protection approach. 
C. The Carotene Products Qual(fYing Criteria 
The gist of Carotene Products' famous footnote 493 provides that 
certain "discrete and insular minorities" cannot protect themselves from 
the pluralistic majority's unfavorable treatment; "[t]herefore the [courts] 
must take special care to protect these minorities" from the politically 
powerful majority's prejudices.94 One appellate case in particular pro-
vides, arguably, the best precedentiallanguage for finding that gays meet 
Carotene Products strict scrutiny criteria. 
In Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University,95 the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals held that Catholic "Georgetown University 
87. See GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 21. 
88. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
89. United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144 ( 1938). See infra Part IV.B.I. 
90. See infra Part VI for one such alternative theory or proposal. 
91. Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search (J{ Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 ( 1972). 
92. GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 23. 
91 See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
94. GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 26. 
95. 536 A.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1987). See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text for addi-
tional information regarding the controversy that this case spurred in Washington, D.C. 
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could not claim a religious freedom exemption from a Washington, 
D.C.," sexual orientation anti-discrimination law.96 As part of her ration-
ale for concurring, Judge Mack stated that "sexual orientation appears to 
possess most or all of the characteristics that have persuaded the Su-
preme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional scrutiny to legis-
lative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause."97 Specifically, 
the Georgetown court determined ( 1) that there is a long and unfortunate 
history of discrimination based on sexual orientation; (2) that available 
evidence suggests that sexual orientation is determined by causes not 
within the individual's control and not generally subject to change; and 
(3) that due to continuing legal and social stigma, gay persons constitute 
discrete and insular minorities whose interests are unprotected by politi-
cal processes.98 In short, therefore, this appellate court was persuaded 
that Carotene Products' ingredients were present in this sexual orienta-
tion trumping religious free exercise case,99 namely: (1) a history of dis-
crimination, (2) immutability of characteristics, and (3) political power-
lessness. Another appellate court has yet, however, to be similarly 
persuaded, and this situation will not likely change because equal protec-
tion proponents and opponents make equally convincing arguments that 
each of these three ingredients apply (or do not apply) in the sexual ori-
entation context. 
1. History of discrimination 
Even most opponents of granting suspect class status to gays con-
cede that gays have experienced discrimination in American society. The 
only courts that have addressed this issue squarely have ruled that even 
though gays are not a suspect class, they "do agree that homosexuals 
have suffered a history of discrimination."100 
Opponents of this rationale, however, do take issue with the degree 
of discrimination, because relative to the black slavery experience, which 
gave rise to equal protection jurisprudence, gay discrimination has not 
been nearly as pervasive and invidious. Further, in more recent history, 
society has increasingly been willing to stigmatize those who discrimi-
nate against gays rather than stigmatize the gay class itself. 101 
96. GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
97. Georgetown, 536 A.2d at 36. 
98. See Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Ra-
cial Equality, 40 How. L.J. 513,522-523 ( 1997) (citing Georgetown 536 A.2d at 31-39). 
99. See supra Part ll.C.2. 
100. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,573 (9th Cir. 1990). 
I 0 I. See supra notes 20-23, 46 and accompanying text. 
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2. Immutability 
Gay rights advocates argue that sexual orientation is immutable be-
cause it is a genetically influenced characteristic-not a choice. Oppo-
nents, on the other hand, respond that most laws (e.g., anti-sodomy stat-
utes, etc.) do not single out gays because of their orientation, but for their 
voluntary behavior. As the Sixth Circuit put it: "Those persons who fall 
within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual orientation are so af-
fected not because of their orientation but rather by their conduct which 
identifies them as homosexual .... " 102 
As mentioned above, gay rights proponents do set forth reasonably 
persuasive arguments. Evidence, including scientific evidence, strongly 
suggests that "sexual identity is immutable and almost certainly geneti-
cally influenced."103 In the alternative, even if sexual orientation is not 
predominantly genetic, proponents undermine whether immutability 
should be a qualifying characteristic when "supposedly immutable char-
acteristics ... are as much creations of culture as of genetics. Racism, for 
example, is a consequence not of differences in human pigmentation, but 
of how those differences are culturally perceived." 104 In fact, many "Af-
rican-Americans" of mixed ancestry must, at some point in their lives, 
"come-out"-they must affirmatively choose whether they self-identify 
themselves as white or black. Therefore, like many gays, they are one or 
the other because of declaration, not immutability. 105 
Opponents, at least based on court results, counter with more persua-
sive arguments. Opponents on the immutability issue argue that gays are 
singled out because they share a common behavior rather than a common 
orientation. One commentator on this issue has stated that 
[i]f the group seeking ... protection is defined by voluntary behavior 
that flouts majoritarian notions of morality, then it seems reasonable to 
ask that group to stop engaging in that behavior. Society singles out all 
sorts of behavior-based groups for negative treatment-adulterers, 
bigamists, and people who use prostitutes, among many other groups. 
106 Yet no one would argue that such groups are suspect classes. 
102. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 
1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). 
I 03. Jack M. Battaglia, Religion. Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment 
Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 359 ( 1999). 
I 04. See id. at 359 n.l 003. 
105. See JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, 
COMMUNITY 28 ( 1995 ). 
I 06. GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 76. 
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Most courts have accepted this argument, especially in light of Bow-
ers v. Hardwick107 and its progeny. 108 Even courts that have not accepted 
this argument have figuratively thrown their hands up and determined 
that this is not a legally amenable issue, but an issue of science, philoso-
phy, sociology, and so forth. 109 Therefore, within the judicial sphere, the 
immutability issue does hold out much promise for gay rights advocates 
despite their reasonably persuasive arguments. 
3. Political powerlessness 
Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans110 sums up one camp of 
pervasive judicial thought on this equal-protection-qualifying character-
istic: 
[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in 
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposable 
income, and of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much more 
ardently than the public at large, they possess political power much 
greater than their numbers .... Quite understandably, they devote this 
political power to achieving not merely a ~rudging social toleration, but 
full social acceptance, ofhomosexuality. 1 1 
In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 
even the "powerless-friendly" Ninth Circuit conceded that gays are too 
politically powerful to be a suspect class when that court recognized that 
"legislatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimination 
suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through 
the passage of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not 
107. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
I 08. See. e.g, GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 67-75 (outlining cases subsequent to the influ-
ential Bowers· decision). 
I 09. See id. at 66-67. 
II 0. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
Ill. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (1996). Of course, gay rights advocates often point to Romer 
v. Evans as a victory case for their efforts because Colorado's controversial constitutional amend-
ment 2, which thwarted the state's granting of "special rights" to the gay community, was struck 
down on equal protection grounds. However, this victory may be fairly characterized as a small or 
hollow one at best because the Supreme Court's majority, employing silently-heightened or "second-
order" rational-basis review, did not elevate the gay class to a higher level of scrutiny. Therefore, in 
the long run, 
Romer sends the signal to lower-court judges that they may have a freer hand to strike 
down antigay laws that happen to seem unfair to them by silently raising the level of 
scrutiny applied to those laws. This is not constitutional protection-it leaves gays and 
lesbians at the whim of the judiciary .... [T]hey can only hope that the particular judges 
who hear their cases happen to consider that treatment unfair. Most often, they have not. 
GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 13 7. 
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without political power; they have the ability to and do 'attract the atten-
tion of lawmakers. "' 112 
Again, on the other side of this argument, proponents of gay rights 
under the equal protection penumbra have convincing arguments. These 
advocates assert, perhaps rightfully, that courts have engaged in using 
double standards against gays. Particularly noteworthy is the Supreme 
Court's "suspect classification" versus "suspect class" standard. 113 
Whites and males, who do not belong to any suspect class, benefit 
from this double standard. For example, in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 114 Alan Bakke, a student seeking admissions to the 
Medical School of the University of California at Davis, claimed that he 
was disadvantaged because he was white. Notably, the Supreme Court 
did not ask whether Bakke belonged to a politically powerless "class." 
Rather the Court switched gears by inquiring whether Bakke had been 
subjected to state policies and laws based on the forbidden "classifica-
tion" of race. Therefore, the Supreme Court extended strict scrutiny re-
view to Bakke's situation even though Bakke was a member of the po-
litically powerful non-suspect white class. 115 Gay rights advocates 
logically posit, therefore, that if strict scrutiny can apply to privileged 
white males, why should courts ask gays to prove that they are powerless 
victims? 
V. TOWARD A RESOLUTION 
Until this point, this Comment has highlighted (I) how the gay rights 
sensitivity training approach, a recent non-legal or educational phenome-
non in the public workplace and (2) how the equal protection framework, 
a more established legal approach, have attempted to provide the treat-
ment that gays seek. In light of what the gay community really desires, 
neither will likely prove successful. When the state mandates compulsory 
attendance to a training workshop that, by its very nature, presents only 
one side of this morally controversial issue, and when the state mandates, 
112. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(emphasis added). Many legal scholars have also advanced this point. Representative of such schol-
ars, Professor Richard Duncan has opined that unlike "racial and ethnic minorities and other groups 
protected by anti-discrimination laws ... homosexuals have not been economically impoverished by 
pervasive and invidious discrimination." Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homo-
sexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 444 
(1994 ). 
113. See, e.g., GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 84-90. 
114. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
115. Whites are not the only beneficiaries of this double standard. The Supreme Court has also 
used "classification" rather than "class" to apply heightened review to males even though males are 
not members of a politically powerless class. See GERSTMANN, supra note 80, at 87-88. See, e.g., 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 ( 1976). 
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by judicial edict rather than by representative legislation, that one side of 
this morally controversial issue shall have its rights elevated, gay rights 
proponents still lose. Specifically, the following sections highlight this 
problem and explain: (I) what change(s) gays optimistically seek from 
the law; (2) how the gay community would more likely achieve these 
changes if they tum to, rather than away from, religious influence; and 
(3) why the gay community should rely upon its shared characteristics 
with religion to develop a principled-basis (rather than state-assisted ba-
sis) for potentially changing the culture as well as its laws. 
A. Of Culture Shifting 
Opponents of gay rights legislation have commented that gay rights 
advocates seek not a change in the law but a "forced . . . cultural 
change ... requiring all of society to give full approval to homosexual-
ity."116 This may be somewhat extreme, but gay rights advocates would 
likely agree that "[u]ltimately, lesbians and gay men desire not only legal 
change, but a change in societal attitudes as well." 117 Few agree, how-
ever, on how to effectuate that change. 
1. New Zealand's experiment 
In the early 1990s, New Zealand enacted massive sexual orientation 
discrimination reform. 11 x New Zealand's parliament not only passed an 
anti-discrimination law but also repealed its military stance regarding the 
gays in its armed services, abolished sodomy as a crime, and gave resi-
dency status to same-sex partners of New Zealand citizens. 119 Gay rights 
advocates were chagrined to learn, however, that New Zealand was a 
progressive society only on paper because "it merely had the formal rules 
that ought to govern an utopia that includes lesbians and gay[s]." 120 De-
spite New Zealand's lawmaking, its gay citizens still lived in the shad-
ows of the national culture. Apparently, a streamlined national govern-
ment that perceives itself as progressive had effected some changes in 
I 16. Response to the Gay Rights Agenda at www.capitolresource.org/rcspon.htm (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2001 ). 
I 17. Marc L. Rubinstein, Note, Gay Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the Argu-
ment rlwt Anri-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate the Establishment Clause, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1585, 
1620 ( 1995 ). Ciay rights advocates generally argue for the accomplishment of three goals: (i) protec-
tion !rom discrimination, especially in employment, housing, etc.; (ii) freedom from intrusion and 
harassment, particularly from the hands of the government; and (iii) some degree of recognition of 
gay rclationshirs. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make 
Social Change, 72 N. Y.U. L. Rl V. 967,968 (1997). 
I 18. See Stoddard, supra note 117, at 969. 
I 19. See id. at 968-969. 
120 !d at 969. 
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the rules, but the cultural climate was decades behind that of even the 
United States. 121 
To change a society's values requires more than tinkering with its le-
gal system. It requires a process similar to one experienced during the 
American Civil Rights era of the late 1950s and early 1960s. 122 When in-
troducing such social legislation, lawmakers have at least five goals. 
First, under a lawmaking paradigm, lawmakers seek (1) to create new 
rights and remedies for victims and (2) to alter the conduct of the gov-
ernment. 123 Second (especially subsequent to the civil rights movement, 
which sought to make change in extralegal ways by seeking social 
change and by seeking to improve the society in fundamental ways), 124 
under a culture shifting paradigm, lawmakers seek (3) to alter the con-
duct of citizens and other private entities; ( 4) to express a new moral 
ideal or standard; and (5) to change cultural attitudes and pattems. 125 
2. Enhancing the likelihood of transcending lawmaking into a culture 
shift: Lessons from the civil rights era 
When interested parties, such as gay rights advocates, desire to 
achieve the second-order type of laws-laws which assist in culture 
shifting-they must consider the source of the new rules. The source of 
new social rules is critical. Generally speaking, legislative rules rather 
than judicial rules are more likely to effect cultural change. For example, 
U.S. citizens in some regions disliked Congress's 1964 civil rights pack-
age, but they did not rise in rebellion. If, however, the 1964 Act had is-
sued from the bench of the U.S. Supreme Court, the decision would have 
been perceived as illegitimate, high-handed, and undemocratic. 126 
That is not to say, however, that the judiciary does not have a crucial 
role to play in the lawmaking to culture shifting process. In the United 
States' experience, its high court prepped the national legislature with its 
landmark Brown v. Board of Education127 case among others. This pro-
vided ten years of examination, reflection, and debate, which, in tum, 
121. See id. at 971~72. 
122. See infra V.A.2. 
123. See Stoddard, supra note 117, at 972. 
124. See id. at 973. 
125. See id. at 972. After passing such social legislation, the affected society may determine 
whether lawmaking has effected culture shifting when there is a sense of (I) a change that is very 
broad or profound; (2) public awareness of that change; (3) legitimacy of the change; and (4) overall, 
continuous enforcement of that change. See id. at 978. Again, reflection upon the United States' 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 serves as an effective model of measuring culture shift. 
126. See id. at 977. 
127. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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enhanced the legitimacy of the subsequent civil rights product. 128 In 
short, "[l]awsuits are effective at highlighting problems," but ineffective 
at long-term resolutions of deep cultural issues because the judiciary is 
rule focused rather than focused on the culture that sustains the rules. 129 
When it comes to culture shifting, "[p ]rocess matters. How a rule 
comes about may, in the end, be as important as what it says." 130 There-
fore, gay rights advocates should focus on legislatures, despite the inher-
ent difficulties in that arduous process, rather than focus intently on the 
courts. William N. Eskeridge, a leading gay rights advocate, adds that 
gay radicals would be ... naive ... if they believed that gay equality 
trumps the rights of everybody else. It would be naive, because we are 
the new "rights group" on the block, and human beings and their insti-
tutions require time and struggle to internalize a new group. 131 
It must not be overlooked, however, that lawmaking is important 
even if it only modifies behavior and never accomplishes the cultural 
shift in attitude. Martin Luther King, Jr. said of the civil rights laws: 
[E]ven though morality may be legislated, behavior can be regulated. 
And this is very important. ... It may be true that the law can't make a 
man love me, but it can keep him from lynching me, and I think that's 
. I 132 pretty Important a so. 
Therefore, to achieve any hope of culture shift, gay rights advocates 
must remove themselves from the equal protection quagmire. A judicial 
decision, even from the Supreme Court, granting gays the suspect class 
status that they seek is unlikely to accomplish culture shift. Therefore, 
the gay community should continue its current state-by-state, municipal-
ity-by-municipality approach, 133 because what this approach lacks in na-
tional uniformity, it compensates for in regional credibility. Also, the 
state, as public employer, must get out of the business of compelling its 
employees to attend gay sensitivity seminars. Endorsing one viewpoint 
over others in this morally controversial area spells increased cultural re-
sentment rather than desired culture shift. 
128. See Stoddard, supra note 117, at 984. 
129. /d. at 985-86. 
130. /d. at 991. 
131. Eskcridgc, supra note 37, at 2473 (emphasis added). 
132. Alfred J. Sciarrino, Civil Ri[<hts: ReliJ<ion in the Public Sphere, 30 How. L.J. 1127, 1133 
(quoting J. WASHINGTON, A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. 480 ( 1986) ). 
133. See supra Part 11.8.2. 
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3. Another lesson the gay rights movement should learn from the civil 
rights era 
Pitting a religious defense against civil rights is not new, 134 but 
Altman is among the recent handful of cases to move this debate into the 
employment arena. 135 Typically, contemporary advocates of gay rights 
consistently complain about the religious opposition's tactics. The 
ACLU's director of the National Gay and Lesbian Rights Project, Mat-
thew Coles, opines that "there is a very concerted effort to say religious 
freedom should give you an out from civil rights law. 'This is the defense 
dujour."' 136 Other advocates agree that "religious freedom [is] a smoke-
screen for discrimination." 137 Some advocates see religion as such a cata-
lyst behind many of the anti-gay-rights initiatives throughout the Union 
that an establishment clause defense should be mounted. Clearly anti-
gay-rights legislation, they say, at the very least entangles the state with 
religiously motivated organizations seeking to roll back gay rights victo-
ries. 138 However, "[ w ]hile political activity by religious groups today 
may be perceived as dangerous by some, the lessons of the Civil Rights 
era [teach otherwise]." 139 
To achieve culture shift, gay rights advocates need to see religious 
factions within our society not as the enemy but as a potential ally. The 
United States Supreme Court sagely recognized the deleterious affects of 
leaving American religion out of society's culture shifting process when 
Justice Brennan stated that "churches as much as secular bodies and pri-
vate citizens" have the right to "take strong positions on public issues in-
cluding ... vigorous advocacy oflegal or constitutional positions."140 
If history teaches anything, it teaches not only that religion as a cul-
turally conservative institution may raise objections to culture shifts such 
as women advancing into the workplace or interracial marriage 141 but 
also that, historically, church leaders have been advocates at the forefront 
of political struggles-especially the culture-shifting struggles-for the 
abolition of slavery, for the granting of universal suffrage for women, 
and for passage of comprehensive civil rights reform. 142 Hubert Hum-
134. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
136. Baker, supra note 66, at 18. 
137. Government Supports Gay Protections in Louisville Case, FEDERAL EEO ADVISOR, Sept. 
15,2000. 
138. See Rubinstein, supra note 117, at 1592. 
139. Sciarrino, supra note 132, at 1129. 
140. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,640-641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
141. See Baker, supra note 66, at 19. 
142. See Sciarrino, supra note 132, at 1129, 1131. 
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phrey emphatically declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could not 
have been passed without the backing it received from the nation's 
churches, 143 where church leaders aroused the nation's conscience "and 
religious individuals put their bodies on the 1ine."144 
B. Reconciliation and Building upon Common Ground 
Although, at first glance, religious freedom and sexual orientation 
freedom tend to collide as bipolar opposites in contemporary American 
culture, in reality, these two principles share much in common. Connect-
ing religion and sexual orientation may, from a religious perspective, be 
an act of profanity or sacrilege; however, at a minimum, these two forces 
are bound by a common history of persecution and prejudice. 145 
1. Similarities between religion and sexual orientation 
Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer146 implicitly connects religion and 
sexual orientation when he refers to the morally controversial kultur-
kampf in which these two forces are engaged. 147 Kulturkampf means 
"culture struggle." The term's popular usage may be traced to German 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's campaign to assimilate or force confor-
mity upon his state's Roman Catholics between 1871 and 1887.148 A cul-
tural struggle need not involve the state, but when the state foregoes its 
neutrality, in the long-term, both sides of the struggle lose because state-
endorsed coercion rarely achieves cultural shift. Of course, state-
sanctioned kulturkampf is not foreign to the American experience. 
Within the area of gay rights, for instance, during the Post-World War II 
era that culminated in the Stonewall riots of 1969,149 America engaged in 
its own kulturkampf against gays. 150 
Religion and sexual orientation, however, share more than a common 
history of state-endorsed persecution. 151 For example, in general terms, 
143. See A. JAMI·:S RI'ICIII.I·:Y, REI.IGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 169 (1985). 
144. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 401. 
145. See Eskeridge, supra note 37, at 2474. 
146. 517 U.S. 620 ( 1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
147. See id. at 634. Justice Scalia states: "The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of 
spite .... I vigorously dissent." !d. 
148. See Eskeridge, supra note 37, at 2413-14. 
149. See generally RlJTIIANN ROBSON, GAY MEN, LESBIANS, AND THE LAW (Martin Duber-
man cd., 1994 ). 
150. Justice Scalia would probably argue that the state did not improve society's aggregate lot 
by switching sides in the Romer decision. 
151. Professor Eskeridge highlights this historical similarity when he scrutinizes gay persecu-
tion in light of the United States kulturkamp against the Mormons. See Eskeridge, supra note 37, at 
2421-27. 
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unlike the protected classes of race and gender, neither are superficially 
discemible. 152 Physical appearance in today's workplace no more reveals 
a worker's sexual orientation than it reveals a worker's religious affilia-
tion. Moreover, individuals with similar sexuality values, like those who 
share similar religious sentiments, tend to seek out a larger community 
with which to associate. 153 Also, religion and sexuality differentiation 
tends to occur within individuals' thoughts and actions. Religious adher-
ents, for example, form a belief and bond with God and their actions of 
prayer or service to others conform with this underlying system of 
thought and emotion. Gays also form within their thoughts a strong emo-
tional or physical connection and seek to interact, even sexually, with 
that "other."154 Finally, adherents tend to think of their religion or sexual 
orientation as a natural "given," while others of another faith or sexual 
orientation are viewed as having "chosen" (albeit incorrectly) theirs. 155 
Of course, there are tremendous differences between religion and 
sexual orientation. The "other" in one context is a Supreme Being that 
relies upon faith to maintain a relationship; whereas, in the sexual orien-
tation context, the "other" is a tangible person. Nevertheless, this and 
other differences do not overcome the similarities which justify that we 
treat these two issues, at least in the public sphere, similarly. At a mini-
mum, gays deserve as much freedom from state-endorsed influences that 
attempt to compel heterosexuality just as much as devout believers de-
serve freedom from coercive influences of compulsory atheism. 
2. A proposal: The state should treat sexual orientation variation 
similarly to how it treats religious variation 
Not only do past achievements of religious-led culture shifts inform 
the gay community how to implement prospective, non-coercive culture 
shift, the very text of the United States Constitution does also. The inher-
ent tensions within the First Amendment's free exercise clause and estab-
lishment clause offer gay rights seekers a means to achieve tolerance of 
sexual orientation diversity the same way that diversity in religion has 
achieved social tolerance. The free exercise clause of the First Amend-
ment "prevents the state from censoring deviant religions and ... pre-
152. See id. at 2418. 
153. See id. at 2419-20. 
154. /d. at 2417. 
155. /d. at 2419. Brian McNaught, a nationally distinguished presenter in gay sensitivity train-
ing seminars, notably equates employers wrestling with sexual orientation issues to the same strug-
gles that employers face when grappling with religious issues in the workplace. See McNAUGHT, 
supra note 40, at xv. 
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vents the state from unduly discriminating against religious belief."156 
The establishment clause, on the other hand, prevents the state from im-
posing its own view of religious orthodoxy upon its citizens. Together, 
these respective clauses provide that the state must allow normative 
groups the opportunity to wither or flourish, and the state, unlike Chan-
cellor Bismark's German state, should not become the means for the tri-
umph of one community over all the others. 157 In other words, "[t]hese 
[First Amendment] principles balance the interests of people of compet-
ing, and indeed antithetical, views and thus achieve a kind of neutral-
iry"-religious adherents are assured protection, and secularists are as-
sured that the government will not promote religion. 158 
Although it is almost certain that a national amendment for sexual 
orientation would never pass, perhaps it would be fruitful to address the 
culture's concerns in this controversial area by approaching legislation in 
a fashion similar to the Founders' approach to the controversial area of 
religious belief. Analogizing sexual orientation issues to the free exercise 
clause, gay rights advocates could freely assert that homosexuality is 
normal, natural, and moral while traditional sexuality advocates could 
maintain their view that homosexuality is abnormal, unnatural, and im-
moral. Both sides are worthy of the respect granted to these antithetical 
positions 159 -atheists and believers, gays and straights alike. Moreover, 
analogizing sexual orientation issues to the establishment clause is con-
sistent with the notion that morally controversial issues are not for the 
government to decide. 160 Neither a judge sitting in Washington, D.C., nor 
a government bureaucrat working in Minnesota is any more competent to 
judge religious truth than sexual truth. 
Of course, both sides of the sexual orientation issue are likely to re-
sent this approach. Gay rights advocates would probably accept the free 
exercise approach, but not welcome a disestablishing position because 
such advocates often want to use the state to teach that opposition to ho-
mosexuality is bigotry and the state should inflict penalties upon those 
who discriminate on its basis. 161 Traditional advocates would resist im-
plementing either clause, particularly the establishment clause because 
156. Eskeridge, supra note 37, at 2415. 
157. See id. 
158. Michael W. McConnell, What Would It Mean To Have a "First Amendment" for Sexual 
Orientation, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 235 
(Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998) (emphasis added). 
159. See id. at 235. 
160. See id. 
16 I See id. at 235-36. 
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such advocates want to maintain a certain level of official stigma to dis-
courage homosexual behavior. 162 
Both sides' respective agendas, however, fail to appreciate the "cul-
ture-benefiting" aspect of such a constitutional approach. The first clause 
commits sexual orientation to the private sphere and, therefore, elimi-
nates the need for public agreement: Each side can go its own way. 163 
The second clause grants equal access: "allow[ing] the competing groups 
to participate in the public sphere on equal terms." 164 Government is re-
strained from expressing a view either way. This approach enhances the 
likelihood of an enduring culture shift in the workplace and beyond. A 
government, however, that resorts to championing one side of this issue 
by proclaiming "Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Pride Month" 
and mandating that its public employees be sensitized to this issue sacri-
fices long-term culture shift at the altar of perceived enlightenment. 165 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Controversial issues such as religious freedom and sexual orientation 
will always be with us, especially in the workplace where we are com-
pelled to interact with one another. Our task, therefore, in a free and plu-
ralistic society, is not to extinguish or unduly limit these core fundamen-
tals. Rather our challenge is to create policy structures that will allow for 
the individual expression of either without harming the commonwealth 
or the aggregate whole of society. We have, relative to the rest of the 
world, achieved this for religion with our Constitutional "first" religious 
rights. This First Amendment, richly complemented by our heritage of 
religious jurisprudence and experience, provides a principled basis upon 
which to do this for other normative communities. By applying the neu-
trality-based principles of the two religion clauses to sexual orientation, 
we may reap the benefits that inure to a healthier pluralistic society rather 
162. See id. 
163. See id. at 237. 
164. /d. 
165. Some may argue that the contextual difference between religion and sexual orientation 
limits some of these analogies. For example, the religion clauses at their inception and to this day 
became effective in a social landscape of multiple religions. Some argue that, the sexual orientation 
landscape is, on the other hand, bipolar in structure with each side claiming the moral high ground, 
meaning that one side can only be right to the exclusion of the other; whereas, in the religion con-
text, mutually exclusivity is not such an issue because many believers recognize that other faiths, 
though "inferior," have some slivers of truth. See id. at 256. This argument, however, unduly over-
simplifies the cultural context. As outlined above, it is unfair to characterize all of society by its 
clashing moral extremes. Polling information and common reason inform us that, with regards to 
issues relating to sexual orientation, Americans are strewn across the continuum of possibilities. 
Therefore, just as a heterogeneous group of religious adherents benefit from neutrality-based free 
exercise and establishment protection, so too should adherents to various views of sexual orientation. 
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than reap the burdens that accompany a pluralistic society that subtly 
seeks to achieve homogeneity through unprincipled or coercive means. 
Josiah N. Drew 
